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1 Introduction 
Modern fractional reserve banks can extend credit by issuing 
fiduciary money – payment media not covered by base money. By 
this power, the banking system can potentially create large swings in 
the volumes of money and credit. A question of longstanding 
controversy is this: Are money and credit cycles smaller when notes 
are supplied competitively by many banks, or when notes are 
supplied monopolistically by a central bank? Ever since the classical 
monetary debates of the 19th century, two views have stood opposed.  
In the “free banking view”, note competition is the necessary 
remedy against credit expansion, since the inter-bank clearing 
mechanism will then check the banks – banks that over-expand will 
suffer reserve losses in the clearing, which will rapidly force them to 
contract. By contrast, a note monopolist (a central bank) is not 
constrained by the clearing mechanism, since its demand liabilities 
will be treated as base money by other banks and hence be used as 
reserves. Money and credit cycles will therefore be larger under note 
monopoly.  
In the opposite “currency view”, the clearing mechanism cannot 
prevent overexpansion if the banks expand in concert, since no bank 
will then suffer net reserve losses in the clearing. The only automatic 
check against overexpansion is through leakage of reserves from the 
banking system – eventually, through an external drain, but also (in 
the case of note monopoly) arising from the public's demand for 
currency. Money and credit cycles will therefore be larger under note 
competition.1  
Although the literature on this subject goes back over a century, it 
has until now been limited to theoretical speculation, with little or no 
empirical backing. This paper moves to fill the lacuna. In late 19th 
century Sweden, about 25 commercial banks called Enskilda banks 
issued notes, competing successfully with the Bank of Sweden, until 
                                                      
1 On the classical monetary debates see Smith (1936), White (1984), Schwartz 
(1992), Selgin and White (1994a). On the modern controversy see Goodhart 
(1988), Laidler (1992), Bordo and Schwartz (1996), and Selgin (2001).    3
this bank gained a note monopoly in 1904. This paper uses Swedish 
bank data from 1871–1915 to investigate how money and credit cycles 
were affected by the note monopolisation. Data show that the money 
cycle became smaller and the credit cycle larger after the Bank of 
Sweden gained a note monopoly in 1904. At the same time, the 
money multiplier decreased, while the credit multiplier increased. 
These facts points to a link between the size of multipliers and the 
size of cycles. How did note monopolisation affect multipliers?  
Note monopolisation trades loss of clearing, or base expansion, 
which increases the multiplier – for leakage, which decreases it. What 
is the relative size of the clearing and leakage effects? It is shown that 
if the central bank's reserve ratio is larger than that of the commercial 
banks, and if the public's preferred currency-deposit ratio is 
sufficiently large, then the leakage effect may dominate the clearing 
effect, such that the money multiplier (and hence the banking 
system's credit capacity) may decrease after monopolisation. This was 
the case when the Bank of Sweden gained a note monopoly in 1904. 
However, the credit capacity is also increased if the public’s preferred 
time-demand deposit ratio increases. This was actually the case, and 
this effect dominated the other effects such that the credit multiplier 
increased. Thus, the multiplier analysis yielded the predictions that 
the money cycle should have decreased post monopolisation, while 
the credit cycle should have increased – a result that is consistent 
with data.  
1  Money and credit cycles 1871–1915 
This section describes the empirical evidence. Using Swedish bank 
data for the period 1871–1915, the amplitude of money and credit 
cycles before and after note monopolisation in 1904 is examined. The 
data are from the Summary of the Bank Reports [Sammanfattning af 
bankernas uppgifter]. These are data from the bank balance sheets 
collected by the Bank Supervisory Authority [Bankinspektionen]. For 
the Bank of Sweden there exists quarterly data for 1871–1877, and 
monthly data from January 1878. For the commercial banks there 
exists quarterly data for 1871–1874, and monthly data from March   4
1875. The transfer of the note stock of the Enskilda banks to the Bank 
of Sweden occurred in 1901–1904. However, since note monopoly 
was prescribed in the Bank Law of 1897 and the Bank of Sweden 
thereafter began to act like a central bank (for example by 
rediscounting bills of other banks), the period under study may be 
divided into three periods: a “note competition period” 1871–1897, a 
“transition period” 1897–1904, and a “note monopoly period” 1904–
1915.  
Problem of a small sample  
Because note monopolisation occurred in 1904, Sweden is fortunate in 
being one of few countries where it is possible to compare the relative 
performance of note competition versus note monopoly in the period 
of the classical gold standard. Unfortunately, there were only ten 
years with note monopoly before the demise of the classical gold 
standard in 1914 at the outbreak of WWI. The cycles sample is 
therefore small, with three cycles in the note competition period 
1871–1897, one cycle in the transition period 1897–1904, and one cycle 
in the note monopoly period 1904–1915. 2 Hence, it is not possible to 
draw definite conclusions regarding the effects of note 
monopolisation on money and credit cycles. There are no degrees of 
freedom left to control for external events, nor is it possible to 
perform statistical tests. The investigation should nevertheless be of 
value, since – to my knowledge – it is the very first empirical study of 
                                                      
2 An alternative would be to extend the data set to include the period 1915–
1935. Since Sweden re-adopted the gold standard in 1924–1931, one more 
cycle for note monopoly on gold would then be available. Calculations of 
cycles for this extended sample was also performed, but they are not 
presented here, since it is generally agreed that macro variables fluctuated 
more in the interwar period than they did prior to WWI, wherefore ceteris 
paribus conditions do not apply (see for example Englund et al 1992). The 
extended-sample results actually reinforce those of the smaller sample, 
namely that the money cycle decreased after monopolisation, while the 
credit cycle increased (available upon request).    5
how note monopoly affects money and credit cycles.3 Although the 
material is insufficient for a final statement on the question of how 
note monopoly affects money and credit cycles, it should provide a 
valuable first word on it, perhaps providing groundwork for future 
comparisons of countries with and without note monopoly during 
the classical gold standard.   
Methodology  
To measure cycle amplitude, moving averages (of logged variables) 
are used. Centred 12-month moving average (MA) series are used to 
filter out seasonal effects, and centred 8-year moving average series 
are used to filter out the trend component. An 8-year period is chosen 
because this was the approximate cycle length (from peak to peak) 
over the sample period. Cycle amplitude is thus measured as follows:  
Cycle amplitude = 12 month MA – 8 year MA.  
Alternatively, cycles were also calculated for cycle periods of 7 and 9 
years. The results were not affected (available upon request).  
1.1 Money  
Two measures of money are examined: notes and fiduciary money.  
Notes include all notes issued by the Bank of Sweden and the 
Enskilda banks. Notes held by other banks as cash are included.   
Fiduciary money include all demand liabilities used as means of 
payment, minus cash. Demand liabilities consist of notes, post bills and 
demand deposits held by the Bank of Sweden, the Enskilda banks 
and the Joint Stock banks. Cash includes gold, other coin, bank notes 
and, after January 1900, balances on giro accounts at the Bank of 
Sweden.  
                                                      
3 Some related studies are Ögren (2003), who investigate long-term trends in 
money and credit in Sweden 1834–1913, and Miron (1986) and Hortlund 
(2005), who study the seasonal effects of note monopolisation in the US and 
Sweden, respectively.     6
The log of notes in 1871–1915 is presented in Figure 1. For the 
period 1871–1878, quarterly data are used.  
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Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
There was a sharp increase in the quantity of notes in 1871–1874, in 
the boom years following the Franco-Prussian war. The subsequent 
decline could partly be due to the new bank law that was 
promulgated in 1874, by which Bank of Sweden notes were no longer 
legal tender for the note-issuing banks. Henceforth, the Enskilda bank 
notes were to be redeemed into gold coin only. There is also a sharp 
drop at the end of 1877. This drop could reflect imperfections in the 
data, particularly the transition from quarterly to monthly data in 
January 1878. The overall impression is that the note cycle did not 
increase after monopolisation. This is confirmed by Figure 2, which 
shows the cyclical component of logged notes for 1875–1915.    7
Figure 2 Cyclical component of log of notes, 1875–1915.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Note: WWI cycle excluded.  
The amplitude of the notes cycle was hardly affected by note 
monopolisation. The three cycles before, during and after transition 
have amplitudes that are more or less similar. By contrast, when it 
comes to fiduciary money, there is a clear tendency towards a smaller 
cycle after monopolisation. Figure 3 shows the log of fiduciary money 
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Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. 
The period 1904–1915 is particularly interesting. In this period, a large 
and sharp credit cycle occurred that peaked in 1907–1908, as will be 
seen below. But the graph for the stock of fiduciary money is virtually 
flat during this period. Figure 4 confirms that the fiduciary money 
cycle became smaller after note monopolisation.  
 Figure 4 Cyclical component of log of fiduciary money, 1875–1915.  
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1.2 Credit  
Two measures of credit are studied: bills, and total lending (bills, cash 
credit and loans). Bills are worth looking at separately for three 
reasons. First, as shown in Hortlund (2005), the discounting of bills 
was the main vehicle by which the commercial banks issued their 
notes. Second, bills were the most elastic form of credit and thus the 
most cyclical one. Third, the discount rate was the prime interest rate 
that was the benchmark for all other rates. Bills were thus the main 
instrument of monetary policy both before and after note 
monopolisation. Figure 5 shows the log of total bank bills 
(commercial banks plus the Bank of Sweden) in 1871–1915.  
Figure 5 Log of total bank bills, 1871–1915.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
The volume of bills varied cyclically with remarkable regularity. 
Calculation of the cyclical component indicates that the cycle 
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Figure 6 Cycle amplitude for log of bank bills, 1875–1935 
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
In the competition period there is a steady downward trend in cycle 
amplitude. Starting in the transition period, the trend turns upwards. 
Compare the 1907–1908 bills cycle with the cycle of fiduciary media 
in the same period. Whereas the bills cycle is large and sharp, the 
fiduciary money cycle is virtually non-existent in this period. For 
total lending, the trend towards larger cycles is even more manifest. 
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Figure 7 Log of total bank lending, 1871–1938.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Note the strong seasonality in lending during the classical gold 
standard period. The amplitude of the lending cycle is pictured in 
Figure 8. The same pattern as the one for bills is present, only even 
more pronounced. The tendency is for the cycle to decrease until the 
transition period, after which the cycle becomes larger.  
Figure 8 Cyclical component of the log of lending, 1875–1915.  
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2  Clearing vs. Leakage: the model  
The empirical evidence revealed that after note monopolisation in 
1904, the money cycle became smaller, while the credit cycle became 
larger. This section analyses whether this result can be attributed to 
the note monopolisation itself. This is done by comparing money and 
credit multipliers before and after monopolisation. If it is the case that 
larger (smaller) cycles are associated with larger (smaller) multipliers, 
then the question of how note monopolisation affects money and 
credit cycles may be indirectly assessed by analysing how 
monopolisation affects the corresponding multipliers. Although 
causation from note monopolisation to cycles cannot be established 
by this approach, at least consistency with data can be achieved.  
Following Thunholm (1962, p. 239), the “credit capacity” of the 
banking system is governed by two items: the quantity of 
precautionary reserves that banks want to hold in relation to their 
(demand) liabilities, and the size of the reserves leakage that arises 
from a credit expansion. Note monopolisation does two things. First, 
it withdraws the demand liabilities of the central bank from the range 
of the clearing mechanism. Thereby the monetary base is expanded, 
which enhances the credit capacity of the banking system. Second, it 
transforms  currency into base money. This installs leakage, which 
constrains the credit capacity of the banking system.  
If the credit capacity of the banking system can be measured by 
the money multiplier, it is possible to quantify the two effects. From 
standard textbooks (e.g. Dornbusch and Fischer 1990) we learn that 
the quantity of money M  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
banking system’s money multiplier m times the quantity of base 
money B. With m fixed, an exogenous change in the quantity of base 
money would cause a change in the quantity of money according to 
the expression:  
B m M ∆ ⋅ = ∆                  ( 1 )      
If the money multiplier were to decrease, then a given change in the 
quantity of base money would cause a smaller change in the quantity 
of money.    13
This kind of mechanical multiplier approach has been criticised 
for being unrealistic as a description of the money supply process in 
the real world (Goodhart 1988). Although this critique may be valid, 
the purpose here is not to describe the money supply process, but to 
use the multiplier approach as a heuristic device to convey relative 
magnitudes of the clearing and leakage effects. For our purpose it is 
enough that the following premise is reasonably valid:  
Premise A larger money (credit) multiplier is associated with larger 
swings in the volume of money (credit).  
Intuitively, the multiplier may be regarded as a measure of how 
“leveraged” the fractional reserve banking system is. A larger 
multiplier means a larger lever, which should translate into larger 
swings in volumes. Indeed, this seems also to have been the case in 
Sweden for the period of study. Figure 9 shows the money-to-gold 
ratio (MGM) of the Swedish banking system, 1880–1915.  
Figure 9 Money-to-gold ratio of the Swedish commercial banking system, 
1880–1915.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
The money-to-gold ratio clearly decreased after note monopolisation 
in 1901–1904. When it comes to the credit-to-gold ratio (CGM), the 
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Figure 10 Credit-to-gold ratio of the Swedish banks, 1875–1939.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Besides being more cyclical than the money-to-gold ratio, the credit-
to-gold ratio steadily increased. In sum, there is a coincidence 
between the size of cycles and the size of multipliers. The money 
cycle decreased after note monopolisation, and the money multiplier 
became smaller. The credit cycle increased after monopolisation, and 
the credit multiplier became larger. The indirect approach is therefore 
warranted.  
The money multiplier  
In a competitive note banking system, all banks have the following 
schematic balance sheet:  
        Table 1 Bank balance sheet, note competition.  
Reserves  Notes 
Credit  Demand deposits 
  Time deposits 
 
The bold faced letters will be used as abbreviations. Also, subscripts 
“cb” and “b” will be used to distinguish variables of the central bank 
from those of the commercial banks. Aggregate variables have no 
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denote variables under note monopoly. Thus, the variable xcb is a 
variable of the central bank in the competition period, while yb´ is a 
variable of the commercial banks in the monopoly period.  
The money stock M consists of notes and demand deposits. 
Denote inside money by I, that is, the money generated within the 
commercial banking system that are redeemable into base money B. 
In the competitive note-banking system they are notes and demand 
deposits. The “pure” note-competitive banking system, where no 
bank’s demand liabilities are used as reserves by other banks, is 
characterised by three conditions. First, the money stock consists 
exclusively of inside money. Second and corollary, base money is 
exclusively used as reserves. Third, base money is gold G.  
Conditions of the pure note-competitive banking system: 
G R B
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c = .                  ( 4 )  
That is, the reserve ratio of the banks and the currency-deposit ratio 
of the public. These are thought of as behavioural constants. Assume 
that all banks have the same reserve ratio rb. The money-to-gold 
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With note competition, the money-to-gold multiplier is equal to the 
money-to-base multiplier, or money multiplier for short. We see that 
the money multiplier is the inverse of the reserve ratio, a result   16
previously derived by Selgin (1994). The currency-deposit ratio plays 
no role in the money multiplier. An increase in the demand for notes 
relative to demand deposits would only exchange one type of inside 
money for another, with no effect on the total volume of money.  
As previously stated, note monopolisation does two things. By 
giving a central bank monopoly on notes, it withdraws the demand 
liabilities of the central bank from the range of the clearing 
mechanism, wherefore its notes and demand deposits become base 
money. The demand deposits of the central bank become equal to the 
reserves of the commercial banks, Rb.  Denote by Rcb and rcb the 
reserves and the reserve ratio of the central bank, where rcb = Rcb /B. 
Note monopoly is characterised by the following conditions:  
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We then form the money-to-gold multiplier (with prime signs on 
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      (7) 
The  MGM of note monopoly consists of two items: the money 
multiplier  m´  of standard textbooks, divided by the central bank’s 
reserve ratio. In contrast to the case of note competition, the money 
multiplier of note monopoly is affected by a change in the currency-
deposit ratio. A larger c means more leakage of reserves, which forces 
the banks to contract. The money multiplier is therefore smaller   17
under note monopoly. If the MGM is to decrease after note 
monopolisation, the following must hold:   
b cb b r c
c
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,                 ( 9 )  
Formula (8) expresses the essential trade-off of note monopolisation. 
Monopolisation creates base expansion, equal to the inverse of rcb. But 
it also installs leakage which lowers the money multiplier from m to 
m´ (c is added to both the nominator and the denominator of 1/rb). 
We saw that the MGM actually decreased after the bank of Sweden 
gained a note monopoly in 1904. An intriguing question is whether 
this fact may be attributed to the relative size of the leakage and 
clearing effects. Under what conditions will the leakage effect 
dominate the base expansion effect, such that the money-to-gold 
multiplier decreases? First, consider the case when the central bank’s 
reserve ratio is equal to that of all the other banks, and when the 
reserve ratio of the commercial banks is unaffected by the 
monopolisation. That is, we have that  
b b cb cb r r r r ′ = = ′ =              ( 1 0 )  
This condition would apply for example if one bank was given a note 
monopoly, and this act did not alter the bank’s reserve ratio. From 
inequalities (8) and (9) we see that m must then be equal to one if the 
total multiplier is to remain unchanged, or smaller than one, if the 
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The money multiplier can at most be equal to one, and this occurs if 
the banks hold 100 percent reserves, or if c is infinitely large. In 
practice this never happens. This yields the following proposition:    18
Proposition 1 If the central bank’s reserve ratio is equal to the 
reserve ratio of the commercial banks, then the money-to-gold 
multiplier will increase post monopolisation.  
Now consider the case when the central bank’s reserve ratio is 
different from the reserve ratio of the commercial banks, and where 
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where α is the share of base money held by the commercial banks. For 
the MGM to decrease after monopolisation, the following must hold:  
) (
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
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cb .                       (15) 
Compare (15) with (9). If a = 1, then all base money prior to 
monopolisation was held by the commercial banks (the central bank 
did not exist prior to monopolisation, or it operated with the same 
reserve ratio as other banks). A prominent example would be the 
inauguration of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. In this case, (15) 
reduces to (9). On the other hand, if a = 0, that is, if all base money 
was held by the central bank prior to monopolisation, then the right-
hand side would become infinite. Since rcb can at most be equal to 
one, this means that the MGM could not decrease after 
monopolisation. Thus, in order for the MGM to decrease, it is not only 
necessary that the central bank’s reserve ratio be sufficiently large   19
compared to the reserve ratio of the commercial banks. In addition, 
the base money share of the commercial banks prior to 
monopolisation must be sufficiently large. Stated explicitly:  
Proposition 2 If the money-to-gold multiplier is to decrease post 
monopolisation, then (i) the central bank’s reserve ratio must be 
higher than that of the commercial banks, and (ii) the base money 
share of the commercial banks prior to monopolisation must be 
sufficiently large.  
Whether the MGM will decrease or not thus depends on the numerical 
relation between rcb, rb, rb´, c and a, in accordance with formula (15).  
The multiplier will decrease more the larger a, rcb, rb´ and c are, and 
the smaller rb is.  
The reserve role of Bank of Sweden notes  
So far we have discussed a “pure” note banking system where base 
money is gold, and where the demand liabilities of the central bank is 
in no way used as reserves by other banks prior to note 
monopolisation. Unfortunately, this condition was not present in 
Sweden prior to 1901. In order to get an operational model it is 
necessary to discuss the reserve role of Bank of Sweden notes prior to 
monopolisation.  
The Summary Reports report banks’ cash balances under three 
headings: “Swedish gold coin”, “Other gold”, and “Silver, copper 
and bronze coin, and Bank of Sweden notes”. The last item was 
changed in January 1900 to include also “Giro accounts at the Bank of 
Sweden”. In the following, total cash balances (“Cash”) will be 
divided into “Gold” and “Other Cash”.  It turns out that Other Cash 
for the commercial banks was quite large – about twice the amount of 
Gold. This is seen in Figure 11.    20
Figure 11 Gold and Other Cash of Swedish commercial banks, 1880–1915.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. Other Cash (1880–1899): “Silver, 
copper and bronze coin, and Bank of Sweden notes”; (1900–): also including 
“Giro accounts at the Bank of Sweden”.  
The quantity of gold held by the commercial banks was more or less 
constant, whereas the quantity of other cash fluctuated more. In 1901 
virtually the whole gold stock was transferred to the Bank of Sweden 
(BoS) in exchange for giro accounts at the bank. It is probable that the 
major part of Other Cash consisted of BoS notes – the banks should 
have had little incentive to hold large quantities of coin (other than 
gold). This means that the Swedish note banking system was not a 
pure “free banking” system, and the reserve role of BoS notes will 
have to be incorporated into the model.  
 Denote  by  Nr BoS notes held as reserves by the commercial 
banks. Define Nr = xaG, that is, BoS notes held as reserves are said to 
be a fixed share of the commercial banks’ gold holdings (which in the 
light of Figure 11 seems reasonable). Bank reserves can then be 
written 
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The BoS notes held as reserves by the commercial banks must be 
subtracted from the total money stock, but added to the stock of 
reserve money held by the commercial banks. The total money-to-
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    (18) 
To get the trade-off between the central bank reserve ratio and the 
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Formula (19) differs from (15) with regard to the constant H. If x = 0, 
then  H  reduces to the ratio rb/a  and (19) and (15) will be equal. 
However, if x > 0 then H will be greater than this ratio. BoS notes 
used as reserves increase the monetary base and hence the multiplier.  
We are now ready to operationalise the model. Figure 12 shows 
the reserve ratios of the commercial banks and the Bank of Sweden, 
as well as the currency-deposit ratio, in 1880–1915.    22
Figure 12 Reserve and currency-deposit ratios, Sweden 1880–1915.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
The cash ratio of the Bank of Sweden was highly stable prior to 
monopolisation, about 0.33. It was not greatly affected by 
monopolisation. The cash ratio of the commercial banks was 0.17 at 
the beginning of the transition period, and 0.20 at the end of it. There 
is a clear increase in the ratio when notes were transferred to the 
Bank of Sweden in 1901–1904 – the commercial banks were thus not 
able fully to substitute their loss of notes for deposits. The currency-
deposit ratio was about 0.8 at the time of transition, both before and 
after. Figure 13 shows the base money share a  of the commercial 
banks in 1880–1915. Figures are presented both for a calculated on the 
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Figure 13 Base money share of commercial banks, 1880–1915.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
For both measures the base money share of the commercial banks 
tended to drop through the whole period. The share of the gold stock 
was nevertheless more than 30 percent until 1894, when it dropped 
because the Bank of Sweden increased its gold stock. It then 
decreased to zero in the transfer period 1901–1904.  
  Figure 14 depicts the essential trade-off between loss-of-clearing 
(base expansion), represented by the central bank’s reserve ratio – 
and leakage, represented by the currency-deposit ratio. This trade-off 
is expressed by formulas (19) and (20). The parameters are: rb = rb´ = 













Figure 14 Break-even central bank reserve ratio as a function of the currency-
deposit ratio.  
 
Note: r = r´ = 0.17, a = 0.33, x = 2.  
The line represents points where (19) holds with equality. Points 
above and to the left of this line are combinations of rcb and c where 
the  MGM will decrease – the leakage effect dominates the loss-of-
clearing effect. Conversely, points to the left of and below the line are 
combinations of rcb and c that for current parameters will cause the 
multiplier to increase – the loss-of-clearing effect then dominates the 
leakage effect. Figure 12 shows that reasonable values for rcb and c are 
0.33 and 0.8. This point is marked in Figure 14, and it lies above the 
line. The conclusion is therefore that the MGM should have decreased 
post monopolisation. This is confirmed by calculating MGMs before 
and after monopolisation, using formulas (18) and (7). The MGM prior 
to monopolisation is  
2 . 7 33 . 0 2
17 . 0
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while the MGM after monopolisation is  












































MGM decreases  25
This is a decrease of about 20 percent, and is roughly consistent with 
the numbers of Figure 9.  
The credit multiplier  
With Thunholm it was argued that the credit capacity of the banking 
system was determined by the bank reserve ratio and the size of the 
reserves leakage that arises from a credit expansion. Hence, the credit 
capacity could be measured by the money multiplier. However, a 
third item is also of importance, namely the public’s preferred time-
demand deposit ratio. If the public wants to hold more time deposits 
relative to demand deposits, then this would enhance the credit 
capacity, since less demand deposits means that less reserves are tied 
up. The money multiplier is therefore a valid measure of the credit 
capacity only under the assumption that the time-demand deposit 
ratio remains unchanged.  
To see this, we calculate the “credit multiplier” in a note-
competitive banking system, in the same way as we did with the 
money multiplier. From the balance sheet of Table 1 we see that the 
credit of the commercial banks Cb is equal to  
  b b b b T D N C + + =            ( 2 3 )  





t = .                ( 2 4 )  
As was the case with c and rb, t is treated as a behavioural constant. 
With regard to the central bank, we assume that it does not have time 
deposits. Before monopolisation, the time deposits of the Bank of 
Sweden were small: The Summary Reports reveal that while the 
commercial banks had a time-demand deposit ratio of around 6 in the 
1880s, the ratio for the Bank of Sweden was below 1. After 
monopolisation time deposits disappeared completely. The central 
bank’s credit is therefore  
Ccb = Icb – Rcb.               ( 2 5 )    26
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Using (16),  the total credit-to-gold multiplier CGM becomes  
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Under note monopoly, the CGM is  
1
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If the CGM is to remain constant after monopolisation, then (28) must 
be equal to (27). Assume that a = 1, and x = 0, that is, all base money 
is held by the commercial banks in the competition period (all banks 
are alike), and no BoS notes are held as reserves by the commercial 
banks. As mentioned, a good example of this situation is the one of 
the founding of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. In addition, 
under the condition that t is constant, that is, t = t´, then if (28) equals 









⋅ = .              ( 2 9 )    27
This is the same condition as the one that pertained to the MGM in (9). 
This means that an increase (decrease) in the MGM means an equal 
increase (decrease) in the CGM, and a sign that the credit capacity of 
the banking system has increased (decreased). By observing a 
decreasing money multiplier, we can predict that credit cycles should 
become smaller. We can state the following:  
Proposition 3 [Prior to monopolisation the gold share of the 
central bank is zero, and the commercial banks do not hold 
central bank notes as reserves:] If the time-demand deposit 
ratio is constant, then a decrease in the money multiplier 
means a decrease in the credit multiplier, and hence a 
decrease in the credit capacity of the banking system.  
However, in the Swedish case, a was smaller than one and x  was 
larger than zero, wherefore Proposition 3 does not necessarily hold. 
Under what conditions will a decreasing money multiplier be 
associated with an increasing credit multiplier? This question is here 
addressed by means of a numerical example. The strategy is to 
calculate the CGM using parameter values that ensure that the MGM 
decreases. Could the credit multiplier simultaneously increase? The 
parameter values are the realistic ones that were used above: r = r´ = 
0.17, a = 0.33, rcb = 0.33, c = 0.8, and x = 2. These parameters ensured 
that the MGM decreased. If t = t´= 5 (see Figure 15 below), the CGM 
before monopolisation becomes (by formula 27) 
20 67 . 1 33 . 0
8 . 1 17 . 0







+ ⋅ .          ( 3 0 )  
After monopolisation it becomes (by formula 28) 
22 1




            ( 3 1 )  
While the money multiplier decreased, the credit multiplier 
simultaneously increased, although the latter increase is small, about 
10 percent. This may be too small a number to be empirically 
relevant. However, the calculus was made on the assumption that the 
time-demand deposit ratio was not affected by the monopolisation. It   28
turns out that this assumption is not warranted. This is seen in Figure 
15.  
Figure 15 Time-demand deposit-ratio, 1880–1915.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Clearly, the time-demand deposit ratio increased after 
monopolisation, from levels around 5 in the competition period, to 
levels around 7 in the monopoly period. It is interesting that 
monopolisation was associated with such a clear increase in the time-
demand deposit ratio. Calculating the post-monopolisation credit 
multiplier with t´ = 7 yields a value of  
26 1




.               ( 3 2 )    
This represents a substantial increase in the credit multiplier, about 
30 percent. As mentioned, the intuition is that an increase in the time-
deposit ratio increases the credit capacity of the banking system, since 
less bank reserves are tied up.  
3 Conclusions   
This paper investigated the quantitative effects of note 
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trades clearing for leakage. Loss of clearing causes a base expansion 
effect that increases the credit capacity of the banking system. By 
transforming currency into base money, monopolisation also installs 
leakage, which curbs the credit capacity. The relative magnitudes of 
these two effects were evaluated through an analysis of money and 
credit multipliers. Empirical evidence showed that the money cycle 
decreased after notes were monopolised by the Bank of Sweden in 
1904, while the credit cycle increased. At the same time, the money-
to-gold multiplier decreased, while the credit-to-gold multiplier 
increased. This opened up for an investigation of how note 
monopolisation affected multipliers. Three results were reached:  
1. If the central bank’s reserve ratio is equal to the reserve ratio of 
the commercial banks, the money-to-gold multiplier will increase 
post monopolisation.  
2. If the money-to-gold multiplier is to decrease post 
monopolisation, then (i) the central bank’s reserve ratio must be 
higher than that of the commercial banks, and (ii) the base money 
share of the commercial banks prior to monopolisation must be 
sufficiently large.  
In addition, if it is the case that prior to monopolisation the gold 
share of the central bank is zero, and the commercial banks do not 
hold central bank notes as reserves (the Fed scenario), the following 
proposition holds.  
3. If the time-demand deposit ratio is constant, then a decrease in 
the money multiplier means a decrease in the credit multiplier, and 
hence a decrease in the credit capacity of the banking system. 
However, these conditions were not fulfilled in the Swedish case. 
In particular, the time-demand deposit ratio increased after 
monopolisation, ensuring that the credit multiplier increased while 
the money multiplier decreased.  
Although the multiplier analysis was capable of generating 
theoretical results consistent with the data, the smallness of the 
empirical sample puts a question mark over the generality of the 
results. To be able to reach more definite conclusions, it would be of 
interest to compare money and credit cycles for countries with and   30
without note monopoly in the period of the classical gold standard. 
Hopefully, this paper has provided some groundwork for such future 
studies.    31
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